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Abstract—Memory spatial errors, i.e., buffer overflow vulner-
abilities, have been a well-known issue in computer security for
a long time and remain one of the root causes of exploitable
vulnerabilities. Most of the existing mitigation tools adopt a fail-
stop strategy to protect programs from intrusions, which means
the victim program will be terminated upon detecting a memory
safety violation. Unfortunately, the fail-stop strategy harms the
availability of software.
In this paper, we propose Saturation Memory Access (SMA),
a memory spatial error mitigation mechanism that prevents out-
of-bounds access without terminating a program. SMA is based
on a key observation that developers generally do not rely on out-
of-bounds accesses to implement program logic. SMA modifies
dynamic memory allocators and adds paddings to objects to
form an enlarged object boundary. By dynamically correcting all
the out-of-bounds accesses to operate on the enlarged protecting
boundaries, SMA can tolerate out-of-bounds accesses. For the
sake of compatibility, we chose tagged pointers to record the
boundary metadata of a memory object in the pointer itself, and
correct the address upon detecting out-of-bounds access.
We have implemented the prototype of SMA on LLVM 10.0.
Our results show that our compiler enables the programs to ex-
ecute successfully through buffer overflow attacks. Experiments
on MiBench show that our prototype incurs an overhead of 78%.
Further optimizations would require ISA supports.
Index Terms—memory spatial error, saturation memory ac-
cess, tolerance
I. INTRODUCTION
Memory spatial errors, i.e., buffer overflows, have been a
well-known issue for computer security in the last decades,
and they are still rife in modern C/C++ binaries. It remains
one of the root causes of exploitable vulnerabilities [1]–[3]
and can lead to various forms of attacking such as Return
Oriented Programming (ROP) [4] and Data-Oriented Program-
ming (DOP) [5], [6]. Existing defense mechanisms can be
divided into two categories: probabilistic and deterministic
[2]. Probabilistic strategies rely on randomization and secrets
to increase the difficulty of an attack. For example, address
space layout randomization (ASLR) adds a randomized offset
in program memory layout and makes it hard to find gadgets
for attacks [7]. Deterministic strategies define security policies
and monitor the behavior of programs to judge whether there is
an ongoing attack. Some of the deterministic methods, such as
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [8], verify the integrity of critical
data, and others may directly detect the out-of-bounds memory
access, such as AddressSanitizer [9]. However, most of the
current defense mechanisms are not suitable for embedded
devices because computing resources are strictly limited in
such environments [10].
Currently, most of the low-overhead defense mechanisms
suitable for embedded devices are based on CFI. CFI monitors
the control-critical data, i.e., all the variables that may reside in
the program counter register, such as function return addresses
and function pointers [8], [11]. With the integrity of such
variables, CFI can ensure that the program follows the original
control flow graph. However, CFI is not perfect. In 2005, S.
Chen et al. introduced a new attack form using non-control
data [5]. In a non-control data attack, an attacker corrupts
configuration, user identity, and other decision-critical data,
bending the victim program’s control flow to acquire secret
data or promote privilege level. In 2016, Hong Hu et al.
improved the non-control data attack into DOP and proved
its Turing completeness [6], [12]. Such attacks are different
from ROP because they do not break the original control flow,
which makes the non-control data attacks undetectable by CFI
protections.
Most of the existing defense mechanisms adopt fail-stop
strategy, which terminates the victim program to mitigate
the attack when detecting an intrusion. However, terminating
a program harms the software availability. The traditional
error recovery mechanism is to reboot the system. Althoug
mechanisms such as checkpointing [13] and fast reboot [14]
help improving the performance of the reboot process, they
are expensive for embedded systems due to the limitation
of computation resources. Moreover, if a vulnerability can
be exploited deterministically, an attacker can utilize it to
launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack until the vulnerability
is patched. And for embedded systems, the pre-patch window
can be very long because of the massive number of devices
and extra requirements from a specific sencario [10].
To address the weakness of fail-stop strategy, failure-
oblivious computing [15] allows the program to execute
through memory errors without termination. Failure-oblivious
computing simply discards out-of-bounds writes and manufac-
tures values to return for out-of-bounds reads. Boundless mem-
ory allocation [16] adopts the same idea as failure-oblivious
computing but with a different strategy. Instead of discarding
out-of-bounds writes, Boundless stores them in a linked list to
avoid overwriting nearby memory objects. According to their
results, both failure-oblivious computing and Boundless can
mitigate buffer overflow attacks without harming the software
availability. In some cases, discarding out-of-bounds writes
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can discard important data like the terminator of string-like
data. Boundless reserves the whole data, but it introduces many
extra memory accesses to maintain the linked lists.
In this paper, we adopt the same idea as failure-oblivious
computing and Boundless to mitigate memory spatial error
vulnerabilities in C/C++ programs. Failure-oblivious comput-
ing and Boundless are both implemented on top of Soft-
bound [17], which incurs significant performance overheads.
To improve overall performance, we implemented a low-
overhead memory spatial error detecting system based on
tagged pointers. When an invalid memory access is detected,
we chose to correct the accessing address to the boundary
of the memory object. We call this memory access pattern
Saturation Memory Access (SMA) because it is much like the
saturation arithmatic in digital signal processing.
SMA is based on a key observation: in normal program
logic, the allocation and use of the memory space match.
Here “match” means that after the initial allocation, the size
parameter of the following use should not exceed the initially
allocated size. This observation reveals that normal program
logic should not utilize out-of-bounds memory access to
achieve a certain goal. As a result, our correction of the address
does not affect the original program behavior and prevent the
occurrence of memory spatial errors at the same time.
To perform the address correction and more importantly,
to detect memory errors, we need to record the boundary
information of memory objects. Considering the limitation of
memory space, and lack of address translation unit in simple
devices, all the metadata management methods that take up
a fixed part of the address space are not suitable for the
embedded environment. Fat pointer schemes [18]–[21] enlarge
pointers to hold memory address and boundary information at
the same time. Although such schemes do not need to shrink
the available address space, they require intrusive modification
of the original source codes and hardware support. Compre-
hensively considering all the factors, we chose to manage
metadata with tagged pointers. Tagged pointer schemes [22],
[23] record metadata in the unused bits of a pointer, so they can
load the metadata and pointer in one memory operation and
bring no extra pressure on the cache. Moreover, the tagged
pointer scheme does not require fixed memory space for
metadata management, so it incurs fewer memory overheads.
We implemented a prototype of SMA in LLVM 10.0 and
evaluated its performance with MiBench [24], a benchmark
for embedded applications. Our prototype showed good com-
patibility and can support most of the benchmarks in MiBench
out-of-box.
II. BACKGROUND
There are three critical elements in the detection of memory
spatial error: memory objects, pointers, and boundary meta-
data. Here we define a memory object as a contiguous segment
of memory allocated by one memory allocation operation.
Memory allocations can be divided into three categories de-
pending on the location of an object, namely allocation on the
heap, allocation on the stack, and allocation in the bss or data
segment of a binary. The commonest type is the allocation on
the heap, which is handled by dynamic memory allocators.
The allocation on the stack is responsible for function local
variables, and sometimes for passing parameters to another
function. Stack variables are allocated and reclaimed through
the movement of the stack pointer. Finally, the allocation in
the binary file allocates memory space for global variables.
Global variables are different from objects on the heap or stack
because their locations are generated during the compilation.
The boundary metadata generates along with the allocation of
a memory object, and they share the same lifecycle.
When allocating memory for an object, we must provide
a critical parameter, namely the size of that memory object.
The object size is closely related to the type of the object. In
C/C++, there are aggregate types like structure and class. An
aggregate type is a combination of multiple types, including
not only basic types but other aggregate types. A memory
object of an aggregate type can be further divided into smaller
objects according to the component types. Such smaller objects
are called sub-object. Below is an example demonstrating the
relationship between a memory object and a sub-object.
s t r u c t{
i n t i d ; / / sub−o b j e c t
char name [ 2 0 ] ; / / sub−o b j e c t
}a ; / / memory o b j e c t
Pointers are the main targets of bounds checking, and the
detection of memory spatial errors is essentially the validation
of pointers. Pointers are generated in two ways, through taking
the address of a variable and through pointer arithmetic.
Taking the variable’s address generates a pointer pointing to a
specific memory object, which is called the intended referent
of the generated pointer. The allocation of a memory object
can be viewed as allocating a memory object and taking its
base address as return value at the same time, so it is classified
as taking address of a variable. Pointer arithmetic generates a
new pointer by applying offset to an existing pointer. A pointer
generated by pointer arithmetic has the same intended referent
as the original pointer. Sometimes, a developer may want to
take the address of a sub-object. In that case, the intended
referent of that pointer should be narrowed to the sub-object.
Most of the memory spatial error detection tools follow
the same basic scheme. Assume the pointer being validated
is p, whose intended referent is object O. The object Os base
address is base and O takes up size bytes. If the following
condition is met, the pointer p is an out-of-bounds pointer.
(p < base) || (p > (base + size− sizeof(∗p)))
With this condition, we can instrument the program and
insert bounds-checking codes before every memory read/write
operations. Below is an example of a checking process.
i f ( p<base ) | | ( p>(ba se + s i z e−s i z e o f (* p ) ) )
e r r o r ( ) ;
d e s t = *p ; / / or *p = s r c ;
When detecting an out-of-bounds memory access, the func-
tion error() terminates the program and reports the details of
that access if demanded. For memory spatial error detection,
the indispensable metadata is base and size of the memory
object O. The main differences between different detection
tools are their implementations of the metadata management.
Traditionally, there are two types of metadata management,
object-based scheme, and pointer-based scheme. Object-based
schemes associate the metadata with memory objects and gen-
erally omit the boundary information of sub-objects. Instead,
pointer-based schemes associate the metadata with pointers,
allowing different metadata for different pointers to the same
object. Both of the two methods have their pros and cons. We
will demonstrate them in detail in the following sections.
A. Object-based Schemes
In object-based schemes, the metadata is associated with
memory objects, so an essential step in the bounds-checking
procedure is to find the intended referent of a pointer. Some
tools view this as a range search. For example, J&K [25] and
CRED [26] record all the active memory objects in a splay
tree. J&K has an 11-12x performance overhead, and CRED
can cut the overhead to around 2x at the cost of only validating
character arrays.
Some object-based schemes use shadow memory to manage
the metadata to reduce performance overheads. The shadow
memory maps every n bytes of the applications memory to
m bytes metadata. For example, AddressSanitizer [9] maps 8
bytes of the applications memory to 1 byte of metadata. Ad-
dressSanitizer places 128-byte inaccessible red zones around
memory objects to mark the object boundaries. The shadow
memory records which part of the memory space is accessible
or not. Any dereference in the inaccessible red zone invokes
an exception that terminates the program. AddressSanitizer
can detect an out-of-bounds access when an illegal pointer
falls into the red zones. But when a pointer goes beyond
the red zone and falls into another object different from its
intended referent, AddressSanitizer is unable to detect that
illegal access.
BaggyBounds [27] divides the address space into slots of
fixed size and combines multiple contiguous slots to form a
memory object. BaggyBounds extends the size of a memory
object to the nearest power-of-2, so it can use fewer bits to
record the object size in the shadow memory. BaggyBounds
also requires all memory objects to align on power-of-2. This
requirement ensures that BaggyBounds can quickly calculate
the base address through the truncation of the pointer address.
Stackbound [28], [29] uses a size table to record the sizes of
memory objects instead of the shadow memory. Stackbound
divides the address space into several regions and only stores
objects of the same size in the corresponding region. Stack-
bound locates the memory region according to the high bits
of the pointer address and then retrieves the size information
with the region index. In this way, Stackbound only needs to
maintain a size table with as many entries as the number of
regions, which significantly reduces memory consumption.
Another type of object-based scheme extends the size of
a memory object and places the metadata next to it. Modern
dynamic memory allocators have adopted similar mechanisms.
Some implementations of malloc() function store the alloca-
tion size at the beginning of the allocated space. SGXBound
[30] adopts this idea and places a pointer which points to
the base address at the end of every object. By modifying
the system memory allocator, this scheme can transparently
reserve the space for metadata.
In object-based schemes, metadata update only happens
at the creation and destruction of memory objects, so we
can manage the metadata by intercepting malloc() and free().
Generally speaking, object-based schemes have good compat-
ibility because they do not need to modify the encoding of a
pointer or the layout of an object. Even if an uninstrumented
library modifies a pointer, it does not affect the relationship
between its metadata and its intended referent. However, the
completeness of object-based schemes is limited because most
of the metadata management methods adopted by object-based
schemes do not support recording metadata for sub-objects or
support it at a high cost [9]. So, it is hard for object-based
schemes to detect sub-object overflow.
B. Pointer-based Schemes
Instead of associating metadata with objects, pointer-based
schemes directly correlate the boundary metadata with point-
ers, omitting the pointer-object mapping. This direct correla-
tion allows two different pointers pointing to the same object
to have their unique metadata, providing the possibility for the
detection of sub-object overflow.
The most representative pointer-based scheme is fat pointer,
which extends a pointer to a structure to hold both address
and the boundary information. The basic idea of fat pointer is
transforming the program during compilation, replacing every
pointer in the program with a corresponding fat pointer. A
typical fat pointer is as follows.
s t r u c t {
void * p t r ;
void * base ;
s i z e t s i z e ;
} f a t p o i n t e r ;
In fat pointer schemes, metadata resides with the pointer,
so retrieving boundaries needs no distant memory read. This
feature grants better locality and less pressure on cache com-
pared with disjoint metadata storage. CCured [19], Cyclone
[20], Hardbound [21], and CHERI [18] use fat pointers to
manage boundary metadata. In a fat pointer system, the size
of a pointer is no longer equal to an integer type because
the system replaces a pointer with a larger structure. This
feature brings great troubles to compatibility. For example, a
pointer parameter cannot be passed through a register during
a function call.
In general, the propagation of metadata is an essential
problem in pointer-based schemes, especially the propagation
across function boundaries. To solve this problem, we can
separate metadata and pointer as in PAriCheck [31] and
SoftBound [17]. SoftBound uses a hash table to organize
pointer metadata and adds a structure named shadow stack at
function call site for metadata propagation. During a function
call, the pointer itself follows the original calling convention.
In the meantime, its metadata goes to the subroutine through
the shadow stack. With the help of the shadow stack, Soft-
Bound provides better compatibility than traditional fat pointer
schemes, but it does not completely solve the compatibility
issues. If an external function manipulates a pointer and
later return it to the codes inside the protection boundary,
SoftBound needs to add a wrapper that updates metadata.
Another pointer-based scheme is tagged pointer scheme,
which stores metadata in the unused bits of a pointer without
changing the size of pointers. Because a pointer stores the
metadata inside itself, the pointer and its metadata can be
loaded in one operation, so tagged pointer schemes bring zero
pressure on cache [32]. Compared with disjoint methods like
SoftBound, tagged pointer schemes do not need to change
the calling convention or add an extra procedure for meta-
data propagation, because the metadata and pointer itself are
compacted together.
Deltapointer [23] is an example of tagged pointer schemes.
Deltapointer shrinks the application address space to 32 bits,
and uses the high 31 bits of a pointer to record the opposite
number of the distance between the pointer and object bound.
The most significant bit is reserved for overflow. During
pointer arithmetic, Deltapointer repeats the operation on the
31-bit tag, which will be masked off before the pointer
dereference. If the previous calculation results in an out-of-
bounds pointer, the most significant bit will be set, and the
masked pointer is an invalid one. MMU will detect this error
and generate an exception that terminates the program. Delta-
pointer achieves 35% average overhead in SPEC CPU2006
benchmark, but it can only detect overflows and ignores
underflows.
Low-Fat [22] Pointer is another tagged pointer scheme. It
encodes the boundary information in a fashion like floating
numbers. Low-Fat Pointer uses 18 bits and divides the bits
into three parts, which represent exponent, base, and bound,
respectively. Instead of having one large block, Low-Fat
Pointer views a memory object as a collection of several small
blocks. The size of those small basic blocks is 2B , and B is
the number stored in the exponent field. Allocations in Low-
Fat Pointer also need to be rounded up in some situations,
but it provides more precision than rounding up to the nearest
power-of-2, like in BaggyBounds.
Pointer-based systems can maintain different metadata for
different pointers pointing to the same object, which grants
the possibility for detecting sub-object overflows. As a result,
pointer-based systems achieve finer granularity than object-
based schemes. In pointer-based schemes, it is easier to
support temporary out-of-bounds pointers in the C standard
because out-of-bounds pointers inherit the original metadata.
In contrast, object-based schemes usually need to take special
care for such pointers. For example, BaggyBounds and CRED
introduce special objects named OOB objects to correlate an
out-of-bounds pointer with its intended referent. However,
the advantages do not come for free. Because of the tight
coupling of metadata and pointers, any operations on a pointer
may affect the metadata, so pointer-based schemes have to
pay more attention to the metadata propagation. Furthermore,
pointer-based schemes usually involve modification of the
pointer encoding, which brings troubles to the compatibility
with uninstrumented libraries. Compatibility is the biggest
obstacle to the wide application of pointer-based schemes.
III. SATURATION MEMORY ACCESS
Traditionally, defense mechanisms adopt fail-stop strategy
to mitigate memory vulnerabilities, which means the program
will stop its execution when the system detect a memory
error being triggered. When combined with automatic recovery
mechanisms [13], [14], fail-stop strategy can effectively block
intrusions. But however effecient a recovery mechanism may
be, fail-stop strategy still turns off at least part of the whole
system for some time. A recovery mechanism can only shorten
the system down time, not eliminate it. Moreover, if an attacker
can deterministically trigger a memory error, then he can utilze
such vulnerability to launch a DoS attack. The defense system
will detect that memory error and terminate the execution
every time it is triggered, and the victim component will
constantly stop responding and reboot.
Failure-oblivious computing [15] and Boundless memory
allocation [16] can help solve the DoS problem. Both of them
allow the program to execute through memory errors without
triggering out-of-bounds writes or reads. Failure-oblivious
computing simply discards the out-of-bounds writes and man-
ufactures values for out-of-bounds reads, while Boundless
instead choses to store out-of-bounds writes in several linked
lists. In some cases, discarding out-of-bounds writes will
discard the terminator of string-like data and leave broken
data. Boundless reserves the whole data, but it introduces many
extra memory accesses to maintain the linked lists.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism called Sat-
uration Memory Access to tolerate memory errors. We aim
to transform every out-of-bounds access into memory access
within the object boundaries, thus eliminating the potential
memory spatial vulnerabilities in the program. Our method
introduces nearly no extra memory accesses and reserves the
ending part of an out-of-bounds write to reseve data with a
special meaning, such as terminator of a string. Our design
is aimed for embedded devices, but can also be used in other
environments with sufficient computation resources. Currently,
our prototype does not handle sub-object overflows because
the protection for sub-objects requires intrusive modification,
and we do not apply such modification for the sake of
compatibility.
A. Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume that the processor hardware
can be trusted, and no hardware vulnerability introduced
during fabrication. An attacker can use the interface offered
by the victim program to create memory spatial errors and get
the ability of arbitrary memory access. However, he cannot
directly overwrite a register. The temporal errors such as use-
after-free vulnerabilities, and side-channel attacks, are beyond
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Fig. 1. Saturation Memory Access
consideration. Our goal is to detect the exploitation of arbitrary
memory spatial errors, and correct the address used by that
memory access to the object boundary, thus assuring the in-
tegrity and confidentiality of the program without terminating
it.
B. Concept of Saturation Access
SMA is based on the critical observation that in normal
program logic, the size of memory allocation matches the
size of following memory use. In general, the memory use
of programs follows the following pattern.
1) Allocate a memory block, assuming the lower and upper
bound are base and bound, respectively.
2) Write w size data into the memory block starting from
w addr, or read r size data from the memory block
starting from r addr.
3) Free the allocated memory block at the end of the objects
lifetime.
In the normal program logic, the following conditions must
be met.
base 6 w addr 6 bound− w size
base 6 r addr 6 bound− r size
It should be noted that, apart from these conditions, there are
more restrictions for a valid memory access. For example, a
memory write should happen before a memory read. Violating
those restrictions leads to other kinds of memory misuses,
which are beyond our main target. In this paper, we focus
on the restrictions directly associated with memory spatial
safety. We believe that programmers do not rely on out-of-
bounds accesses to implement the program logic, and those
tricks using out-of-bounds accesses can be replaced with in-
bounds operations.
If we add paddings to each object for the out-of-bounds
data, we can redirect all the out-of-bounds accesses to the
padding area, as shown in Fig 1. In this way, out-of-bounds
accesses that may damage the integrity and confidentiality of
a program are turned into unharmful memory accesses. As
for the original program logic, legal reads and writes should
not use the padding area, so we can neutralize out-of-bounds
accesses and leave the original logic without interference.
As a result, we enlarge the size of an object to add paddings
during memory allocatios. If a memory access goes beyond an
objects boundary, we change the address used by this access
to one of the object boundaries. For an overflow, the address
is changed to the upper bound of the object; for an underflow,
the address is changed to the lower bound of the object. In
digital signal processing, there is a different form of arithmetic
named saturation arithmetic. Instead of wrapping around the
values exceeding the maximum value to the minimum value
and vice versa, the saturation arithmetic sets overflowed values
to the maximum and underflowed values to the minimum. Our
memory access policy is much like the saturation arithmetic,
so we call our access pattern as Saturation Memory Access.
C. Pointer Encoding
Similar to other memory spatial error mitigation tools, SMA
needs to record the boundary information of memory objects.
We chose to use tagged pointers for metadata management.
The choice is made for following reasons. First, tagged point-
ers embed the metadata inside pointers, avoiding the extra
memory accesses to retrive boundary information. Second, a
tagged pointer scheme does not require dedicated memory
space for metadata storage, so it is suitable for embedded
devices with relatively strict memory limitations. Third, tagged
pointers directly correlate metadata with pointers, which, as
stated before, helps to solve the sub-object overflow problem.
Although we do not detect overflow on sub-objects, we still
want to chose a design with potentials for improvement.
To simplify the encoding of metadata in the prototype, we
enlarge the size of an memory object to the nearest power-
of-2. Every memory object should be aligned on its enlarged
size during allocation. In this way, we can only record the
exponent B in a pointer and the size of its intended referent
will be 2B bytes. Because of the alignment requirement, the
base address of an object can be easily obtained by setting
the low B bits of a pointer to 0. Additionally, the enlarged
size should be at least 8 bytes bigger than the original size,
and the exponent should increase by 1 if not. This is because
the load/store instructions in a 64-bit system manipulate at
most 8-byte data, so reserving 8-byte padding can leave the
in-bounds data without interference. We reserve the highest 6
bits of a pointer for B to cover the biggest possible object size
in a 64-bit system.
The main drawback of this encoding is the massive internal
memory fragments, which is extremely wasteful when the size
of an object is slightly exceeds a power-of-2. If an object
has a size of 2n + 1 bytes, then our memory allocator will
allocate 2n+1 bytes. For objects smaller than 8 bytes, things
are worse because of the padding requirement. But although
small objects incur large internal fragment ratio, the absolute
value of the internal framents is relatively small.
D. Metadata Generation and Propagation
In C/C++, a pointer is generated by memory allocation or
derived from an existing pointer. As for the former, we can
generate its tag at the allocation time; for the latter, we must
ensure that the metadata correctly propagates from the original
pointer to the new pointer.
The memory objects in C/C++ can be divided into three
categories: stack objects, heap objects, and global variables.
Stack objects are the local variables created during function
execution. Taking the address of a stack object generates a
stack object pointer. Heap objects are generated by dynamic
memory allocators. Programs get a heap object pointer by
calling dynamic memory allocating functions. Global variables
are different from the former two categories because their
allocations happen during the compilation. Compilers allocate
global variables in the data segment of a binary, and the
corresponding addresses are written into the assemble codes
of the final binary file.
In conclusion, stack objects and heap objects are dynam-
ically generated during execution, while global variables are
generated statically during compilation. As a result, we should
add extra codes into the program to tag pointers pointing to
stack and heap objects. As for global varibles, we handle
them by adding a shadow global variable for each global
variable. The shadow global variable holds the tagged address
of original global variable. We will discuss global variables in
detail in V-A1.
Through pointer arithmetic and pointer cast, new pointers
can be derived from existing pointers. New pointers should
inherit the metadata from the original pointers because legal
pointer operations should be restricted inside the same object;
thus, the derived pointer and its origin share the same intended
referent. It should be noted that the address-of operator (&)
should be included in pointer arithmetic. For example, &p[n]
equals to p+n, and &(p–>val) equals to p+offset, where the
sub-field val is offset-byte from the base address of the object.
E. Analysis of Saturation Access
To analyze how SMA tolerates memory spatials errors,
consider two scenarios: one with out-of-bounds reads and one
without.
If there is no out-of-bounds read in the program, then all
the data come from within object boundaries. When an out-
of-bounds write happens, the overflowed data only affects the
padding area. As the data within legal boundaries remain
unchanged, the program can still get benign data for later
execution. So SMA can ensure the original program behaviors
and continue to execute if there is no out-of-bounds read.
From the semantic perspective, an out-of-bounds read tries
to get data from nowhere. With unpredicted return values, we
cannot define the outcome of later execution. So while we can
prevent those illegal reads from leaking secret data, we cannot
tell if later execution follows the original logic. However, if
SMA does not write to one particular address more than once,
the stored data is the same as the input. As a result, if out-of-
bounds writes happen before an out-of-bounds read, the read
can get the input as-is given a large enough padding area. In
such cases, the program is likely to continue execution, but
may produce meaningless outputs.
Another case is underflow. When an underflow happens,
SMA changes the access address to the base address of
memory object. Unlike overflows, we do not reserve paddings
at the beginning of objects. This is because that most attacks
rely on overflows to overwrite critical data and underflows are
relatively rare. So we do not reserve paddings for underflow
and leave it to the built-in error handlers in the program.
In conclusion, SMA can ensure the program to continue
execution when there is no out-of-bounds read. As for the out-
of-bounds reads, SMA can prevent them from leaking data,
and make tha program likely to continue execution.
IV. POINTER TAGGING
Tagged pointer schemes have various advantages in manag-
ing metadata. The tagged pointer effectively correlates meta-
data with pointers, making the metadata query introduces
almost no overhead. Also, it does not need to arrange dedicated
memory space or memory operations for metadata manage-
ment. However, the advantages do not come for free. Tagged
pointers change the expression of pointers, which brings
various challenges to both compatibility and performance. It
should be noted that these challenges are shared by all the tools
that use the tagged pointer scheme for metadata management,
and all such tools need to find solutions for the challenges.
In this section, we will discuss the common challenges
faced by tagged pointer schemes and how we solve them
in SMA. Apart from the tags making addresses invalid, the
common challenges can be concluded in 4 aspects. (1) Pointers
may be used as integers, either by the program itself or by
the compiler optimization. (2) Uninstrumented libraries are
unaware of the change of pointer expression and may generate
pointers without tags. (3) Attackers may corrupt the tag with
arithmetic operations to manipulate the pointer metadata. (4)
Microarchitecture features can affect the performance of a
tagged pointer system.
A. Pointers as Integers
The C standard defines the compare operation and sub-
traction operation for pointers, requiring that the result is
meaningful only when the two pointers point to the same
object. In the real scenes, C programs usually make more
assumptions to use pointers as integers, but the C standard
[33] does not guarantee those assumptions.
For the sake of the compatibility, tagged pointer systems
need special care for pointer operations, i.e., removing the
tag of a pointer before specific operations. If the tags remain
in the pointers, certain operations generate unexpected results,
possibly making the control flow deviate from the normal flow,
and in the end, make the program crash or generate wrong
outputs. Such errors are common in the systems where the
tag of a pointer changes along with the pointer address. If
all the pointers pointing to the same memory object share the
same tag, then some of the pointer operations do not produce a
wrong output, e.g., calculating the distance between two sub-
objects with pointer subtraction.
1) Pointer Comparisons: In the C standard, the pointer
comparison produces a reasonable result only when the two
pointers point to the same object, or when they are from the
same aggregate object. In the real world, programs usually
use pointers as integers and assume that pointers have total
order, e.g., the sort of pointers. But if tags are embeded in
pointers, this assumption is no longer true, especially when
the tags change along with the address calculation. In SMA,
a tag represents the size of an object, which does not change
after the creation of the object. As a result, all the pointers to
the same object share the same tag.
2) Bitwise Operations: Generally, the operands of bitwise
operations are not pointers. But some non-conforming pro-
grams use bitwise operations on pointers to detect or enforce
alignment properties. In most cases, such operations should not
affect the tags, because they usually manipulate the lower bits
of a pointer. More carefully, we can track the pointer operand
of a bitwise operation with the use-def chain in LLVM [34].
If the result is used as a pointer later in the execution, then the
tag should be preserved, or else, the tag should be removed
from the result. Programs may also first use a pointer as an
integer, then apply a bitwise operation on it. We can also track
such cases with the use-def chain.
3) Pointer Arithmetics: Normally, arithmetic operations
apart from the addition and subtraction do not produce rea-
sonable results on pointers. However, compilers may transform
expressions involving pointers in a way that sometimes pro-
duce unexpected pointer operations. For example, compilers
may transform (b − a) × 2 into b × 2 + (−a) × 2 during
optimization, introducing pointer multiplication operations.
We can track the usage of operations result with LLVM’s use-
def chain, and decide whether or not to remove the tag.
4) Tags Defined by Users: Some programs define their own
pointer tags, either by union types or by bitwise operations.
These tags contradict with the tags introduced by a tagged
pointer system, and the contradiction cannot be solved without
the knowledge of program semantic. A possible solution is to
reserve several bits for user-defined behaviors. For example,
SMA only uses the highest 6 bits of the address space, leaving
10 bits available for programmers to use.
B. Coverage
Theoretically, a defense system based on tagged pointers
should tag every pointer in the program to ensure the com-
pleteness of the protection. However, it is hard to ensure
complete coverage because the uninstrumented libraries cannot
handle tagged pointers and may produce pointers without tags.
In other occasions, we want to improve the performance by
omitting the tags of pointers known to be safe.
As a result, a robust protection system should consider
how to handle the pointers without a tag. We could add
extra branches to judge whether there is a tag embedded
in the pointer by comparing tag bits with 0. Unfortunately,
introducing extra branches affects the speed of bounds check-
ing significantly. According to our experiments, introducing
branch instructions in the bounds checking brings about 9%
performance overhead on average. As a result, we need a
unified approach to handle tagged pointers and tagless pointers
at the same time. In SMA, we store the complement value of
the original tag in the high bits of a pointer. During the bounds
checking procedure, the tags should be inverted first. For a
tagless pointer, we get a tag with all 1s after the inversion,
which represents a large memory object size. In this way, SMA
treats tagged pointers and tagless pointers alike and avoids the
low-performance branches.
The uninstrumented library is an inherent problem for every
tagged-pointer-based system. Uninstrumented functions do not
know the existence of the metadata tag and can generate
unexpected results when using a tagged pointer. Those func-
tions may directly use tagged pointers for memory access,
compare a tagged pointer with a tagless pointer, or use a
tagged pointer as an integer. Because of the unpredictable
behaviors, a protection system cannot ensure the integrity of
metadata tags in the uninstrumented libraries. This problem
is in fact a problem of the protection boundary. A memory
protection system always has a boundary. The codes within
that boundary can be protected, while the codes outside of the
boundary cannot. If we do not recompile the external libraries,
then the protection boundary falls between the codes seen by
the compiler and codes in the libraries. However, even if we
instrument all of the libraries, we merely push the protection
boundary from library calls to system calls.
SMA sets the protection boundary on uninstrumented li-
brary functions. When a pointer is passed into an unin-
strumented function, it leaves the protection field of SMA.
Defining the protection boundary requires a series of rules to
guide the removal of tags and re-addition of tags. The rules
for tag removal are required universally, while the re-addition
rules depend on the security policy of a system.
C. Metadata Corruption
Tagged-pointer-based systems should carefully distinguish
pointers from integers to ensure the correct program output
and protect metadata from being overwritten maliciously. Take
the following scenario for an example: a program accesses the
data at ptr+0x4, then attacker overwrites the offset and changes
it to 0x40000000000000004. If the address calculation uses
maliciously overwritten offset, the metadata tag in the result
pointer is corrupted, causing the following bounds checking
process to make a wrong judgment.
To avoid such metadata corruptions, we can instrument ev-
ery arithmetic operation with pointer operands, and remove the
metadata tag before the operation happens. Considering that
pointers may be used as integers, there can be numerous such
arithmetic operations, and they are hard to be distinguished
from normal integer operations. Furthermore, instrumenting
all of such operations brings significant performance overhead.
Another method is adding hardware support. For example, the
Low-Fat pointer [22] uses dedicated instructions for pointer
arithmetic. The processor checks the validity of a pointer
during the execution of a pointer arithmetic instruction, and
mark the pointer as invalid using hardware types when the
pointer goes beyond object boundaries after the calculation.
In our prototype, we solve this problem with a pure software
method. When a memory object is allocated, SMA generates a
new pointer baseptr with metadata at the same time. The new
pointer baseptr is not used in the original program execution.
It always points to the base address of the memory object and
is only used in the bounds-checking process. Furthermore, the
baseptr only exists in the register, unless it is swapped out
by the compiler due to the lack of registers. In that case, we
think that the swapping codes can be trusted because they
are generated by the compiler. During the checking, SMA
retrieves the base address and metadata tag from baseptr.
Because the baseptr is transparent to the interface provided
by the original program, and that attackers cannot directly
manipulate the value of a specific register in our threat model,
so the attacker cannot overwrite the baseptr. In this way, we
prevent the metadata from being corrupted.
The baseptr is generated according to the following rules.
• For the pointer to a global variable, load from the global
variables corresponding shadow global variable.
ptr = &GlobalV ariable
baseptr = LOAD (tagged GlobalV ariable)
• For the pointer derived from pointer arithmetic, its baseptr
is the same as the original pointer.
ptr = ptr ori + offset
baseptr = BASE (ptr ori)
• For the pointer derived from a type-cast, its baseptr is the
same as the original pointer.
ptr = (type∗) ptr ori
baseptr = BASE (ptr ori)
• For a phi node, the baseptr is one of the incoming values
of the phi node.
ptr = Φ(q1, q2, ..., qn)
baseptr = Φ(base1, base2, ..., basen)
• For a pointer generated by memory allocation, calculate
the tag based on the allocation size and put it at the high
bits of the pointer to get baseptr.
ptr = malloc (size)
baseptr = tag (size) | ptr
When a pointer is used as a function parameter, the
corresponding baseptr should be propagated into the called
function at the same time. SoftBound [17] solve the similar
metadata propagation problem by adding an extra shadow
stack and change the original calling convention. For the sake
of compatibility, we do not change the calling convention.
Instead, we recalculate the baseptr based on the parameter
after entering the function being called. To ensure the validity
of the metadata tag during the propagation, we must insert
a check before the function call. If the pointer parameter is
within the object boundaries before entering the function, we
can still get an accurate baseptr with the parameter.
D. Hardware Support
Most of the codes added by a tagged pointer system are
simple arithmetic operations, like bitwise operation, addition,
and subtraction. Although these instructions execute rather
quickly in a modern processor, these extra instructions still
bring pressure to the overall performance. Some architectures
add MMU-based features to support the masking of tagged
pointers. For example, the Address Tagging in ARMv8 archi-
tecture allows the processor to ignore the highest 8 bits during
address translation [35], and the SPARC-M7 architecture of
Oracle can support a tag as large as 32 bits [36]. These hard-
ware features eliminate the need for masking instructions and
provide significant convenience for tagged pointer systems.
Apart from the address translation, the architecture can also
add support for metadata safety, e.g., Low-Fat Pointer [22]
introduces hardware types and dedicated pointer operation
instructions. Some more intrusive schemes even modify the
whole processor to support the metadata management and
the security policy. For example, CHERI [18] adds dedicated
registers for capability. This kind of support is generally
designed for a specific protection system and binds with
particular security policies. So, such support has a narrower
range of applications compared with MMU-based support for
masking.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement the SMA prototype on x86-64 and ARMv8
architecture. The prototype is based on LLVM 10.0 and
consists of two parts, LLVM C++ pass, and runtime helper
functions. The project will be made open-source upon accep-
tance.
To make the compiler as easy to use as possible, we
implement our prototype as an LLVM sanitizer. Programmers
only need to add an extra flag to the original compiling
procedure, and the SMA pass will be enabled and harden
the program. The resulting binary can be executed as-is with
no extra processing. A hardened program can automatically
correct the address of a memory access upon detecting an
out-of-bounds access, thus ensuring the memory accesses are
always within legal boundaries and mitigating memory spatial
vulnerabilities at object granularity.
A. Instrumentation
SMA instruments the program at the LLVM IR level to gen-
erate and propagate boundary metadata. The bounds checking
process and the correction of out-of-bounds addresses are also
inserted at IR level. The instrumentation can be divided into
the following parts: adding shadow global variables, finding all
the instructions to be checked, metadata generation, inserting
codes for checking and correcting, and processing tags on the
protection boundary.
Tag Global
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Remove Tags
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Fig. 2. Instrumentation
1) Global Variables: As we mentioned in III-D, the allo-
cation of a global variable happens during the compilation.
We instrument the global variables by adding a constructor at
the startup of a program. This constructor generates a tagged
pointer for every global variable and stores it in a shadow
global variable. Shadow global varibles do not exist in the
original codes. When SMA checks the validity of a global
variable pointer, the corresponding shadow variable is loaded
as the baseptr for that pointer.
2) Bounds Checking: To check the bounds for a pointer,
we need to find the positions to insert the checking codes
during the compilation. Also, we need to find which objects
the pointers to be checked correlate with, then generate and
propagate the metadata to the checking points.
Generally, there are two ways of inserting bounds checking:
checking when a pointer is changed, or checking when a
pointer is dereferenced. The former monitors the pointer
arithmetic and some of the integer arithmetic considering
the pointer-as-integer cases, while the latter mainly monitors
load and store instructions. Moreover, considering that the
protection boundary of a protection system often lies on the
call of functions, both of the insertion choices should pay
special attention to functions with pointer parameters.
SMA adopts the latter policy, i.e., checking before the
pointer dereference. In the C standard, a pointer is allowed
to exceed its legal boundary on condition that the pointer is
not dereferenced. So, if we check pointer validity at pointer
arithmetic, then we should not correct the address at once to
tolerate temporary out-of-bounds pointers. Instead, we should
wait until the dereference actually happens, and this makes the
checking process the same as the checking-before-dereference
method. Considering the numerous cases of pointer-as-integer,
we think it is more concise to monitor load and store instruc-
tions.
As stated before, we use volatile baseptr to prevent the
metadata corruption, which is generated and propagated ac-
cording to the rules in IV-C. SMA first finds all the places
to insert bounds checking codes, i.e., the load and store
instructions. Then, SMA tracks the origin of the pointer used
for memory access recursively according to the generating
rules of baseptr. This recursive process correlates the pointers
being checked with the metadata of their intended referents,
ensuring the correct propagation of metadata.
With the baseptr, the checking process is direct and straight-
forward. We can get the base and bound of a memory object
with simple bitwise operations and additions after retrieving
the tag with a fixed mask. Then, we only need to compare
the pointer itself with the base and bound to judge whether
the pointer exceeds the object boundary. In conventional out-
of-bounds detection systems, an exception is thrown upon de-
tecting the dereference of an out-of-bounds pointer. However,
SMA needs to correct the address instead of simply throwing
an exception. When an underflow happens, SMA changes the
address to the base address of the object, and when an overflow
happens, SMA changes the address to the bound address
subtracting the access size. Moreover, we found that branch
instructions should be avoided. According to the experiments,
using branch instructions instead of cmov instructions can
bring 9% more performance overhead.
3) Function Calls: Similar to all the tagged-pointer-based
systems, SMA has a protection boundary to decide when the
tags on pointers should be removed. SMA places the boundary
between the codes seen by the compiler and the codes in
uninstrumented libraries, which means that SMA removes the
tag when a pointer is passed to uninstrumented libraries.
Apart from uninstrumented libraries, there are some other
functions that need special care. In some functions, a pointer
parameter is “passed by value” instead of “passed by refer-
ence”. Passing a parameter by value means that the parameter
is duplicated when entering the function. As a result, we need
to remove the tag of such parameters, or the tag can lead to
memory access with an invalid pointer.
B. Address Tagging
The Address Tagging feature in ARMv8 architecture allows
MMU to ignore the highest 8 bits of an address during
translation. This feature can effectively support a tagged-
pointer-based system by allowing the compiler to omit many
instructions for tag removal. In SMA, we can utilize this fea-
ture and preserve tags for load/store instructions and function
parameters passed by value. However, because this feature
relies on the translation procedure, the use of tagged pointers
beyond memory access may still bring problems; for example,
the comparison between pointers still needs to remove tags.
Experiments show that Address Tagging can cut more than
10% performance overhead.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SMA with
MiBench [24], a benchmark designed for embedded envi-
ronments and still widely used today. We also evaluate the
security efficiency with the RIPE [37] benchmark. Finally we
use some of the real-world vulnerabilities from BugBench [38]
to verify the ability of tolerating memory spatial errors. The
performance experiments are additionally run on a 3.0GHz 16-
core ARMv8 CPU with 32GB DRAM. This extra experiment
utilizes the Address Tagging feature in the ARMv8 to analyze
the components of performance overheads. All other experi-
ments are run on a 1.70GHz 16-core Intel Xeon E5-2609 CPU
with 32GB DRAM, and the OS is a Ubuntu 16.04 with ASLR
disabled.
A. Performance
We use MiBench for performance evaluation. MiBench [24]
is a widely used embedded benchmark suite proposed in 2001.
The original MiBench is relatively old, so we chose to use
LLVM Testing Infrastructure [39]. It is a built-in test suite of
LLVM and includes MiBench. Among all of the 17 programs,
only one program, typeset, does not exit with correct output.
We disabled tests that run for a very short time. The disalbed
tests are jpeg, ispell, stringsearch and blowfish. The runtime
of these programs are all under 0.01s, making them unsuitable
for performance measurements.
We compare our performance with SoftBound [17]. Soft-
Bound protects both programs from both spatial errors and
tmporal errors, and used by Boundless [16] as its foundation.
When compiled with SoftBound, lame, dijkstra, jpeg, typeset
and rijndael cannot produce correct outputs. We omit the
performance data of typeset because both SMA and SoftBound
cannot run this test correctly.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF SMA AND SOFTBOUND ON MIBENCH
benchmark original SMA SoftBound
basicmath 641 649 590
bitcount 116 117 225
susan 65 214 485
lame 227 735 -
dijkstra 52 206 -
patricia 162 228 233
rijndael 75 101 -
sha 28 76 120
adpcm 434 480 622
CRC32 322 417 682
fft 104 113 133
gsm 176 531 803
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Fig. 3. Normalized Performance
Table I shows the MiBench results on x86 platform. As
MiBench tests all run for a relatively short time, we run every
test for 1000 times and record the accumulated time. Figure 3
shows the normalized results. From the results, we can find
that SMA incurs much less overheads than SoftBound. It
should be noted that SMA incurs nearly no overheads on basic-
math and bitcount. This is because both tests are computation-
intensive and have few memory operations. On average, SMA
incurs 78% performance overheads on MiBench.
B. Overheads Analysis
We further analysis the components of overheads on ARM
platform. The Address Tagging feature of ARMv8 allows us
to omitting the tag removal instructions for loads and sotres.
We analyze overheads with SPEC CPU2017, which contains
various complex real-world programs, including video en-
coding and decoding, simulation, and artificial intelligence.
Tests in SPEC CPU2017 are much larger in scale than those
in MiBench. The larger scale brings more memory accesses
and amplifies the impact of each component of the overall
overhead so that it can be observed more clearly.
We chose the 12 pure C/C++ programs in the speed set of
SPEC CPU2017 for the analysis. Among the 12 programs,
600.perlbench s, 602.gcc s, 623.xalancbmk s, 641.leela s
cannot produce correct outputs. Several similar bounds-
checking tools reported problems alike. 600.perlbench s and
602.gcc s cannot execute correctly without modifications to
the source code. As reported by SGXBounds, gcc has unions
of pointer-ints and manipulates high bits of the pointer. For
623.xalancbmk s and 641.leela s, they encounter issues in the
uninstrumented library codes by comparing tagged pointers
with tagless pointers.
Table II shows the SPEC CPU2017 results on the ARM
platform. In the table, “no mask” means omitting the re-
moval of pointer tags with Address Tagging, and “no check”
means omitting the bounds checking procedures. The last two
columns use branch instructions instead of cmov instructions
to implement the bounds checking procedure. From the results,
we can find that the removal of pointer tags makes up 11-
16% of the total overhead, so the Address Tagging feature is
effective in improving the overall performance.
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As stated before, we found that the branch instructions
would slow the checking process, and we did further research
on this subject. As shown in Fig 4, the branch instructions in-
cur about 9% more execution time. Moreover, the benchmarks
in which branch instructions incur the most overheads are also
the ones the Address Tagging can benefit most. In Fig 5, we
can observe that x264 s, deepsjeng s, and imagick s benefit
most from the Address Tagging feature, and they also suffer
most from the branch instructions. This correlation originates
from the fact that SMA inserts the checking process before the
dereference of pointers, so the number of checking process is
the same as the number of the tag removal process.
The overheads of SMA consist of three main parts, check-
ing, masking, and metadata management. The total overhead
is defined as the overhead when the masking and checking
are both enabled. As shown in the Fig 6, the checking process
makes up most of the overheads in both encoding schemes.
In the floating encoding, the checking process incurs more
overheads than that in the buddy encoding because the floating
encoding needs more instructions to decode tags. Moreover,
adding instructions to a program brings extra pressure to
the execution pipeline, and may affect the branch prediction
or other microarchitecture level behaviors. We classify such
overheads to the “others” category in Fig 6. The details of
this part of overheads require in-depth experiments, and we
leave them for future work.
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Fig. 6. Components of the Overheads
C. Security Efficiency
We use the RIPE [37] benchmark for security efficiency
evaluation. RIPE is an extension of Wilanders and Kamkars
testbed and aims to provide a standard way of testing the
coverage of a defense mechanism again memory spatial errors.
The RIPE testbed has 5 dimensions: location, target code
pointer, overflow technique, attack code, and function abused.
It covers 850 attack forms, and if attacks with different
payloads are viewed as different attack forms, RIPE can
generate over 2000 attack forms.
We compare the security efficiency of original Clang,
SoftBound-CETS [17] and SMA on the x86-64 platform
TABLE II
SPEC CPU2017 RESULTS ON ARM
benchmark llvm-base with maskwith check
no mask
with check
no mask
no check
with mask
no check
no mask
with check
branch
with mask
with check
branch
mcf s 1701 3439 3365 1732 2101 3766 3692
omnetpp s 1011 2364 2263 1576 1753 2384 2378
x264 s 744 2322 2118 817 1136 2513 2516
deepsjeng s 634 1570 1396 791 904 1664 1651
xz s 4304 6977 6534 4442 4844 7268 7062
lbm s 3217 3260 3641 3840 3023 3763 3597
imagick s 14492 30541 27934 14772 16922 31765 31719
nab s 6046 9148 8663 6077 6564 8994 9014
with system ASLR disabled. There are 1334 attack forms
considered possible by RIPE, and each of the possible attacks
was tried for 3 times. The results of the attack experiment are
listed in Table III. In the table, “partly” means some of the
tries succeeded while the others failed.
TABLE III
RIPE RESULTS
Success Partly Fail Fail%
Clang 1289 13 32 2.40%
SoftBound-CETS 0 0 1334 100%
SMA 65 0 1269 95.13%
From the results, we can find that SoftBound-CETS blocked
every possible attack. SoftBound-CETS is a complete defense
mechanism mitigating both spatial errors and temporal errors
[2]. As for SMA, there are some attacks that succeeded.
Further investigation of the results showed that the successful
attacks breach the protection through sub-object overflows. For
now, our prototype does not support saturation accesses on
sub-objects, but it still mitigated most of the memory spatial
errors and greatly increased the security efficiency comparing
to the original Clang. It should be noted that none of the failed
attacks reported segmentation fault, so all the failure of attacks
should be attributed to the saturation access mechanism instead
of compatibility issues. From the results, we can conclude that
SMA is an effective protection against the memory spatial
error.
D. Tolerance
There are 6 programs with buffer overflow vulnerabilities in
BugBench, namely bc, gzip, man, ncompress, polymorph and
squid. Some of the bugs cannot be reproduced with modern
compilers and libraries. For example, poly morph 0.4.0 in
BugBench reports an buffer overflow error during compilation,
and the overflow in gzip 1.2.4 is caught by a system call. We
reproduced the vulnerabilities in bc 1.06 and ncompress 4.2.
Both of the programs will trigger a segmentation fault when
provided with a buggy input. We recompiled the two programs,
and they both exited normally with error logs generated by
built-in error handler.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Bounds Narrowing
Our prototype does not detect sub-object overflow for now
out of compatibility consideration. Because SMA correlates
metadata with pointers instead of objects, it is possilbe for
SMA to do bounds narrowing and store sub-object metadata
in a pointer. To support bounds narrowing, we need to add
type layout information into the program. EffectiveSan [40]
provides a way to achieve this. However, maintaining metadata
for every sub-object often introduces intrusive modifications to
program source codes for SMA, e.g., the memory layout of
a structure may have to be changed to fulfill the alignment
requirements, which may seriously harm the compatibility of
the program. We leave the integration of type information as
a future work.
B. Protection Boundary
Currently, we place the protection boundary between the
codes seen by the compiler and the codes of uninstrumented
libraries. As stated before, we can push this boundary to the
system calls if we recompile the library codes. To further
expand the protection boundary, we need to modify system
ABIs and kernel codes. CHERI has accomplished part of that
modification and has made system ABIs aware of the CHERI
capability [41]. In SMA, the size of the pointers does not
change, so such modification would be less intrusive when
expanding the protection boundary to OS kernel, or even
BIOS.
C. Optimizations
Fig 6 shows that the overheads of SMA mainly come from
the checking process. There are serval methods to reduce the
number of chekings, such as ABCD [42] and WPBOUND
[43], which can be integrated with SMA. Also, if we could
modify the hardware, then we are able to add more dedicated
support for SMA. For example, we could integrate the decod-
ing of tags with the execution of load/store instructions. Those
instructions inherently have a long execution time because of
the interaction with another memory hierarchy. So, adding
a checking process consisted of only arithmetic operations
should not expand the critical path, and the overhead of
checking can be easily overlapped. We believe that adding
support at the ISA level for bounds-checking is a promising
topic for future research.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
A. Tolerance
The idea of tolerating the memory errors instead of termi-
nating the program is much like Boundless [16] and failure-
oblivious computing [15]. The main difference between SMA
and these two mechanisms is the way of handling memory
errors. Instead of discarding or storing all the out-of-bounds
data, SMA removes the complicated linked list in Boundless
while still reserves parts of the input data. Moreover, Bound-
less is built on SoftBound and failure-oblivious is built on J&K
[44], both of them are known to increase great performance
overheads.
B. Tagged Pointers
DeltaPointer [23] stores the distance between current ad-
dress and the upper bound of an memory object. It moves
the bounds checking procedure to MMU and greatly reduces
the performance overheads. But DeltaPointer can only detect
overflows and leaves underflows undetected, which is its main
drawback.
SGXBounds [30] also adopts tagged pointers. SGXBounds
aims to protect programs within the SGX environment. SGX
uses 64-bit pointers but only allows porgrams to use a 32-bit
address space. SGXBounds stores a pointer to the upper bound
of a memory object in the top 32 bits of a 64-bit pointer, and
stores the base address next to the end of that object. The
application of SGXBounds is restricted in SGX, and retriving
the base address will introduce an extra memory load.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel, automatic memory spatial
error mitigation system with low memory and performance
overhead. We use tagged pointers to record the boundary meta-
data of memory objects and require special alignment during
memory allocation to quickly locate the pointers intended
referent. With Saturation Memory Access, we can restrict
all the memory accesses within the boundaries of objects.
The prototype is implemented on LLVM 10.0 and is able to
mitigate nearly all of the attack forms in the RIPE benchmark,
incurring 78% performance overhead on MiBench. Further-
more, with hardware supports such as Address Tagging in
ARMv8, we can achieve even lower performance overhead.
To be concluded, SMA can stop most of the attacks caused
by memory spatial errors with competitive overhead. To foster
further research in the field, we will make the source code of
our SMA prototype available as open-source upon acceptance.
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